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Overview 
In this paper we present results from an agent-based simulation model of two sequentially 
cleared electricity markets. Agents can bid on both a day-ahead market for physical delivery 
contracts and a day-ahead balancing power market and learn from their achieved results. 
Different scenarios of the order of market clearing and pricing rules are tested and their results 
are compared. We show that prices are lower in both markets when the day-ahead market is 
cleared first. We also show that pay-as-bid leads to lower resulting prices than a uniform price 
mechanism. 
Methods 
In a restructured electricity market where electricity transmission and generation are separated 
from each other, a transmission system operator (TSO) needs to procure balancing power 
from the market. In this environment, a generator that disposes of fast controllable generation 
units faces the problem of deciding whether to bid in a day-ahead market or to commit his 
units for balancing purposes. This increasing complexity of electricity trading and bidding 
decisions raises the necessity for methods and tools that allow modelling a variety of aspects.  
The aspects that have to be addressed in a realistic electricity market model comprise strategic 
supplier behaviour, i.e. bidding above marginal cost strategies (e.g. Cramton [2004]), and the 
factor of daily repetition in trading (e.g. Rothkopf [1999]). A third important aspect in 
electricity market modelling is market interrelationships, as electricity is traded on different 
time scales, e.g. day-ahead, real-time, and also in form of different products, e.g. physical 
delivery, reserved (balance) capacity.  
We apply agent-based simulation as a tool that has the potential to meet the aforementioned 
requirements and is a very promising approach for realistic electricity market modelling. It 
allows representing bidders as profit-maximising adaptive agents that can learn from their 
trading results in daily repeated auctions. And it can include several different markets that are 
linked together through the agents’ trading decisions.  
In our model generators are represented as adaptive agents that apply reinforcement learning. 
Within the tested scenarios, we differentiate between bidding strategies in a day-ahead market 
with physical settlement, and strategies in a day-ahead balancing power market. We shift the 
order of market execution and vary the pricing mechanism from pay-as-bid to uniform price.  
Results 
Resulting prices on the day-ahead market are depicted in Table 1. Prices attain a higher level if 
the day-ahead market is cleared after the balancing power market. The intuition behind this 
result is that competition is lower on the supply side in these cases, as some generators have 
already committed a part of their capacity on the balancing power market. When fewer agents 
compete on the day-ahead market, they can more successfully bid above marginal cost and 










DayAheadBalance_uniform 40.65 30.00 60.00 6.45 
DayAheadBalance_payAsBid 37.01 20.00 65.00 7.32 
BalanceDayAhead_uniform 66.14 35.00 100.00 15.56 
BalanceDayAhead_payAsBid 64.03 35.00 100.00 16.28 














DayAheadBalance_uniform 358.82 19.10 158.00 0.00 500.00 75.00 65.70 21.52 
DayAheadBalance_payAsBid 273.80 17.54 60.23 0.00 431.25 75.00 76.42 20.26 
BalanceDayAhead_uniform 393.79 17.51 225.00 0.00 475.00 99.75 45.83 20.53 
BalanceDayAhead_payAsBid 354.29 17.21 206.25 0.00 457.88 75.00 55.04 21.24 
Table 2: Simulated capacity/work prices on the balancing power market 
Table 2 represents the resulting capacity and work prices on the balancing power market. 
Here, we observe that prices tend to be lower when the market is cleared second. This can be 
explained by the fact that agents mainly base their bid decision on their opportunity costs on 
the balancing power market. High prices on the day-ahead market mean high foregone profits 
for an agent that commits his capacity for minute reserve purposes. Thus, higher prices on the 
day-ahead market also causes prices to be higher on the balancing power market. 
The question whether pay-as-bid or uniform price leads to lower market prices is 
controversially discussed in the literature (e.g. [Kahn et al. 2001], [Rassenti, Smith, Wilson 
2003], [Bower, Bunn 2001]). Our simulation results suggest that pay-as-bid results in higher 
bid prices, but the bid price increase is not high enough to result in higher overall prices. 
Conclusions  
We find that prices on the day-ahead market are higher if this market is cleared after the 
balancing power market. We argue that this is due to the fact that competition is weaker in 
this case, as some agents have already committed (part of) their capacity on the balancing 
power market. The reduced supplier concentration enables agents to successfully bid higher 
mark-ups to their marginal costs. Results on the balancing power market give a different 
picture: prices are lower if this market is cleared second. Here, the effect of agents integrating 
their opportunity costs into their result evaluation leads to higher prices when day-ahead 
prices are high, and lower prices when day-ahead prices are low. As for the pricing rule on the 
balancing power market, we find the following result: average prices are higher under 
uniform price than under pay-as-bid although agents bid at higher prices under pay-as-bid. 
The increase in bid prices is outweighed by the effect of all infra-marginal bidders receiving 
the marginal, i.e. highest accepted bid under uniform pricing.  
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